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RAISING THE DEAD: AN EXAMINATION OF IN RE
KINGSBURY AND MAINE’S LAW REGARDING
INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND POSTHUMOUS
PATERNITY TESTING
Dylan R. Boyd*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2001, Ben Erskine, a man who claimed to be the son of renowned guru
Paramahansa Yogananda, planned to ask a Los Angeles judge to order that the guru’s
body be exhumed for DNA testing to determine Erskine’s paternity.1 Erskine’s
allegations threatened both Yogananda’s reputation and the fortune of his estate, which
belonged to his organization the Self Realization Fellowship.2 In 2002, seven years
after the allegations arose, conclusive tests comparing Erskine’s DNA and that of
Yogananda’s surviving male relatives in India resolved the controversy and vindicated
the guru, thus putting to rest the looming possibility of exhuming his body for DNA
testing.3
The difficult legal questions that the Los Angeles judge would have faced—in the
event that dispositive DNA tests of Yogananda’s living male relatives had not been
made available before litigation—have been raised in similar, albeit less sensational,
cases in courts nationwide.4 In 2008, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the
Law Court, considered these questions in the case of In re Kingsbury.5 In particular,
the Law Court upheld the Probate Court’s decision that required the legitimate
daughter of a decedent to submit to DNA testing or, alternatively, that the decedent’s

* J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Maine School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Laura
Underkuffler and Professor Melvyn Zarr for their valuable insight and guidance, which helped make this
Note possible.
1. Ron Russell, Exhuming the Truth, NEW TIMES L.A., November 29, 2001, http://www.rickross.com/
reference/selfreal/selfreal4.html.
2. Id. The existence of a love child, mothered by a devotee of Yogananda, would show that the guru
broke his vow of celibacy. Id. In addition, Yogananda’s followers believe that the guru’s body is in
“immutable” condition, having resisted decomposition since the time of his death in 1952. Id. Had he been
successful, Erskine potentially could have claimed a stake in the ownership rights of Yogananda’s image
and likeness as well as the considerable wealth and property holdings of the Self Realization Fellowship.
Id.
3. Teresa Watanabe, DNA Clears Yoga Guru in Seven-Year Paternity Dispute, L.A. TIMES, July 11,
2002, at B3, available at http://www.rickross.com/reference/selfreal/selfreal7.html.
4. Charles Nelson Le Ray, Implications of DNA Technology on Posthumous Paternity Determination:
Deciding the Facts When Daddy Can’t Give His Opinion, 35 B.C. L. REV. 747, 766 n.122 (1994)
(collecting cases). See, e.g., Batcheldor v. Boyd, 423 S.E.2d 810, 815 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992); Alexander v.
Alexander, 42 Ohio Misc. 2d 30, 34 (1988); In re Estate of Greenwood, 587 A.2d 749, 757 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991); Le Fevre v. Sullivan, 785 F. Supp. 1402, 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
5. 2008 ME 79, 946 A.2d 389.
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body be exhumed for testing to determine the paternity of the petitioner, who claimed
to be the decedent’s illegitimate daughter.6
This Note begins by exploring the development of the law regarding illegitimate
children and the determination of paternity as it relates to intestate succession, with a
focus on the law in Maine. Part II of this Note discusses the possible methods of
posthumous paternity testing and the ways in which the law in Maine and other
jurisdictions has responded to those methods.
In Part III, this Note summarizes the Kingsbury decision and its importance. Next,
in Part IV, this Note confronts the question presented by Kingsbury by examining the
interests that inform the analysis. More particularly, this Note will explore the interests
of the illegitimate child in determining her true paternity—including intestacy
inheritance rights, knowledge of both parents’ medical histories, and a fuller sense of
personal and cultural identity—as well as the interests of those who would be tested
or affected by testing of the decedent’s body. This Note suggests that in balancing
these interests, the interests of the illegitimate child in determining her true paternity
outweigh opposing interests, particularly in the context of posthumous paternity cases.
This Note concludes by proposing a revision of Maine’s probate law that would (1)
provide a hierarchy of sources from which to obtain DNA samples for posthumous
paternity testing, and (2) give the Probate Court the authority to order such testing
upon a sufficient showing that paternity will be established.
II. JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND PROOF OF PATERNITY
A. Proof of Paternity to Establish Intestate Inheritance Rights
According to the English common law, an illegitimate child was filius nullius (the
child of no one) and lacked intestate inheritance rights.7 Many states, including Maine,
departed from the harshness of English common law and moved “in the direction of
humanity and justice towards innocent and unoffending sufferers.”8 Although Maine’s
intestacy law mitigated the harshness of English common law, it required “some
positive act on the part of the putative father in order to make the illegitimate child heir
of the father.”9 For example, in the late nineteenth century, an illegitimate child’s right
of inheritance was recognized only if the putative father married the mother of the
child, adopted the child, or acknowledged before a public official that he was the
father.10
In the case of children born in wedlock whose paternity was called into question,
the legal system historically recognized a presumption that the mother's husband was
also the child's father.11 However, as one Commentator noted, “changing norms in the
American family and scientific advancements in genetic testing have challenged the

6. Id. ¶ 1, 946 A.2d at 391.
7. Le Ray, supra note 4, at 750 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *459).
8. Messer v. Jones, 34 A. 177, 179 (Me. 1896).
9. Id.; see also In re Joyce’s Estate, 183 A.2d 513, 514 (Me. 1962) (“[T]he illegitimate child will be
deprived [rights of inheritance] unless an affirmative act is performed.”).
10. Messer, 34 A. at 179.
11. Megan Pendleton, Intestate Inheritance Claims: Determining a Child’s Right to Inherit When
Biological and Presumptive Paternity Overlap, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2823, 2825 (2008).
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strength of the marital presumption over the past several decades.”12 Accordingly,
courts and legislatures must decide “which relationships, biological or social, are most
important in determining the existence of a father-child relationship.”13
B. Supreme Court Decisions Involving Inheritance Rights of Illegitimate Children
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of the inheritance rights of
illegitimate children in two seminal cases: Trimble v. Gordon14 and Lalli v. Lalli.15 In
1977, the Trimble Court held that section 12 of the Illinois Probate Act, which allowed
a child born out of wedlock to inherit by intestate succession only from the mother
(while a child born in wedlock could inherit by intestate succession from both the
mother and the father), denied children born out of wedlock equal protection of the
law.16 Applying a standard of intermediate scrutiny, the Court found the statute
possessed only an “attenuated relationship” to the state’s asserted goals of promoting
two-parent families and the orderly disposition of estates.17 Accordingly, the Court
held that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.18
One year later, in Lalli, the Court upheld a New York statute that permitted nonmarital children to inherit from their biological father only if paternity had been legally
determined during the father’s lifetime.19 The Court upheld the statute on the ground
that the requirement of a paternity judgment during the father’s lifetime furthered the
state’s goals of ensuring accuracy, simplifying estate administration, and discouraging
fraudulent paternity claims.20 In addition, the Court noted that the statute in this case,
unlike that in Trimble, did not condition inheritance rights on the marriage of the
biological parents.21

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
430 U.S. 762 (1977).
439 U.S. 259 (1978).
Trimble, 430 U.S. at 776. Section 12, in relevant part, stated:
An illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any maternal ancestor, and of any person
from whom his mother might have inherited, if living; and the lawful issue of an illegitimate
person shall represent such person and take, by descent, any estate which the parent would
have taken, if living. A child who was illegitimate whose parents inter-marry and who is
acknowledged by the father as the father's child is legitimate.
Id. at 764-65 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. c. 3, § 12 (1973)).
17. Id. at 768-70. Intermediate scrutiny requires that classifications bear a rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose. Id.
18. Id. at 776.
19. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 264-66. Section 4-1.2 of New York’s Estates, Powers and Trusts Law provided:
A non-marital child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his issue inherit from
his father and his paternal kindred if . . . a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the
lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation declaring paternity or the mother and father
of the child have executed an acknowledgment of paternity . . . .
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a)(2)(A) (McKinney 1967).
20. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 271-72.
21. Id. at 273.
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C. Maine’s Intestate Succession Law Regarding Illegitimate Children
Today, intestate succession rights of illegitimate children are determined by
reference to title 18-A, section 2-109 of the Maine Revised Statutes—contained in
Maine’s version of the Uniform Probate Code (MPC).22 Section 2-109 expands the
possibility of inheritance rights for illegitimate children by allowing paternity to be
established “by an adjudication before the death of the father” or “thereafter by clear
and convincing proof.”23 Thus, the MPC provides two exceptions to the old law that
required some positive act on the part of the putative father in order to make an
illegitimate child his heir apparent.
Interestingly, Maine’s law regarding proof of paternity in intestate succession proceedings is inconsistent with its law regarding proof of paternity in child support proceedings. Questions regarding proof of paternity in child support cases are answered
by reference to title 19-A, sections 1558 and 1561 of the Maine Revised Statutes
—contained in Maine’s version of the Uniform Act on Paternity (MAP).24 In contrast
to the MPC, the MAP explicitly allows for blood and tissue tests in determining

22. The statute, in relevant part, provides:
[A] person born out of wedlock . . . is also a child of the father if:
(i) The natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before or after the birth of the
child, even though the attempted marriage is void; or
(ii) The father adopts the child into his family; or
(iii) The father acknowledges in writing before a notary public that he is the father of the
child, or the paternity is established by an adjudication before the death of the father
or is established thereafter by clear and convincing proof . . . .
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109(2)(i)-(iii) (1998).
23. See id. § 2-109(2)(iii).
24. Section 1558 provides that courts may “order the mother, child and alleged father to submit to
blood or tissue typing tests.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1558 (1998). Additionally, section 1558
provides that “[i]f a party refuses to submit to those tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity
against the party or may enforce the order, if the rights of others and the interests of justice so require.” Id.
Section 1561, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
1. Effect of results. The results of the tests required pursuant to section 1558 are evidence
to be used in determining paternity as follows.
A. If the court finds that the conclusion of all the experts, as disclosed by the
evidence based upon the tests, is that the alleged father is not the parent of the
child, the question of paternity must be resolved accordingly.
B. If the experts disagree in their findings or conclusions, the question must be
submitted upon all the evidence.
C. If the experts conclude that the blood or tissue tests show that the alleged father
is not excluded and that the probability of the alleged father's paternity is less
than 97%, this evidence must be admitted by the court and weighed with other
competent evidence of paternity.
D. If the experts conclude that the blood or tissue tests show that the alleged father
is not excluded and that the probability of the alleged father's paternity is 97%
or higher, the alleged father is presumed to be the father, and this evidence must
be admitted.
The court shall admit as evidence the results of any genetic test that is of a type generally
acknowledged as reliable by accreditation bodies designated by the federal Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services and performed by a laboratory approved by such
an accredited body.
See id. at §1561.
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paternity and provides for the admissibility and evidentiary weight of the possible
results of such tests.25 While it seems logical to apply the evidentiary model of the
MAP to intestate succession proceedings under the MPC, Maine’s current statutory
scheme does not appear to recognize the inferiority of the MPC’s proof of paternity
requirements as compared to those of the MAP. In particular, the MPC is inferior in
this respect because of the scientific certainty with which paternity can be proven by
DNA testing.26
It is worth noting that a later version of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), which
Maine has not adopted, revises the proof of paternity requirements so as to defer to the
applicable state paternity statute for determination of paternity in intestate succession
proceedings.27 Thus, if Maine were to adopt this revised version of the UPC, proof of
paternity in intestate succession proceedings would be determined by reference to
sections 1558 and 1561 of the MAP. However, this is not the case.
As a result of the MPC’s silence on the issue of biological evidence, the questions
surrounding proof of paternity in intestate succession proceedings are left to the
Probate Court. The MPC confers both personal and subject matter jurisdiction on the
Probate Court in intestate succession proceedings.28 Moreover, the Probate Court has
equity jurisdiction “concurrent with the Superior Court, over ‘all cases and matters
relating to the administration of the estates of deceased persons, to wills and to trusts
which are created by will or other written instrument.’”29 Thus, in intestate succession
proceedings calling for a determination of paternity, the Probate Court is left to decide

25. In contrast, for purposes of posthumous paternity testing, title 18-A, section 2-109 merely allows
for “clear and convincing proof.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109(2)(iii) (1998).
26. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unfairness of requiring “clear
and convincing” proof for posthumous paternity determinations while making it difficult to obtain
dispositive DNA evidence; see also Ilene Sherwyn Cooper, Advances in DNA Techniques Present
Opportunity to Amend EPTL to Permit Paternity Testing, N.Y. ST. B.J., July-Aug. 1999, at 34, 41 (1999)
(citation omitted) (discussing the scientific accuracy of DNA testing). Cooper explains:
For paternity applications, the odds that two unrelated people possess the same DNA band
pattern have been calculated to be, on average, 30 billion to one. Given that the Earth’s
population is about 5 billion (only 2.5 billion males), it is impossible to be more sure of a
paternity determination with any other available test.
Id.
27. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114, 8 U.L.A. 91 (1997). The proposed statute states:
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), for purposes of intestate succession by,
through, or from a person, an individual is the child of his [or her] natural parents,
regardless of their marital status. The parent and child relationship may be established
under [the Uniform Parentage Act] [applicable state law] [insert appropriate statutory
reference].
See id. § 2-114(a), 8 U.L.A. at 91.
28. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 252 (1998). The Kingsbury court explained:
[T]he Probate Court has both personal jurisdiction over Kingsbury's estate as a resident of
Sagadahoc County at the time of his death, . . . and subject matter jurisdiction over
MacMahan's petition in that it regards “subject matter relating to . . . estates of decedents,
including construction of wills and determination of heirs and successors of decedents and
estates of protected persons . . . .”
Kingsbury, 2008 ME 79, ¶ 7 n.3, 946 A.2d at 393, n.3 (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 1-302(a)
(1998 & Supp. 2008)).
29. Kingsbury, 2008 ME 79, ¶ 7 n.3, 946 A.2d at 393, n.3 (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 252
(1998)).
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what constitutes “clear and convincing proof” and in what ways that proof may be
obtained.30
The Law Court’s recent decision in Kingsbury reveals the inadequacy of Maine’s
probate code. In Kingsbury,31 the Law Court considered the following questions arising
from the Probate Court’s order to exhume the body of an intestate decedent for paternity
testing: (1) Is an interlocutory appeal appropriate under the death knell exception where
the appellant seeks to prevent an exhumation? (2) Does the Probate Court have the
authority to order an exhumation?32 Before addressing the Kingsbury decision, it is
helpful to consider the possible methods of posthumous paternity testing and their legal
implications.
III. METHODS OF POSTHUMOUS PATERNITY TESTING
A. Testing Relatives Who Are Parties to the Action
The Probate Court may order an examination of the “physical condition (including
blood group) of a party” upon a showing of “good cause.”33 Accordingly, the Probate
Court is authorized to order a party, who is a blood relative of an intestate decedent,
to submit to DNA testing to determine the paternity of a petitioner.
The MAP authorizes courts to order the mother, child, or alleged father submit to
“blood or tissue typing tests.”34 However, this statute primarily concerns child support
litigation and seemingly presumes that the putative father is alive.35 Accordingly,
under the current statutory scheme the MAP has no obvious relevance to cases
requiring posthumous paternity testing.
B. Testing Collateral Parties
One Commentator has suggested that the law in states such as Maine “fails to
recognize the utility of performing blood or DNA tests on collateral persons.”36 This
reluctance to test collateral parties, however, is likely rooted in conflicting policy
concerns. For example, in other jurisdictions where the question of testing collateral
parties has been presented, courts have struggled to balance the right of illegitimate
children to prove paternity with the privacy interests of those to be tested.37

30. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109 (1998).
31. 2008 ME 79, 946 A.2d 389.
32. Id. ¶ 1, 946 A.2d at 391.
33. See ME. R. CIV. P. 35(a); ME. R. PROB. P. 35.
34. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1558 (1998).
35. See Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Hafford, 2003 ME 15, ¶ 9, 815 A.2d 806, 809 (noting that the
legislature enacted the UAP to specify “a father’s child support responsibilities”).
36. Le Ray, supra note 4, at 755.
37. See, e.g., Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So.2d 474, 476 (La. 1991) (noting that the
plaintiff’s right to discover her true paternity is weighed against the invasion of the legitimate daughter's
privacy that would result from a compelled blood drawing); Voss v. Duerscherl, 408 N.W.2d 161, 166-67
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (considering four factors in a right-to-privacy balancing analysis: (1) the importance
of the state's purpose in requiring the intrusion in question; (2) the nature and seriousness of the intrusion;
(3) whether the state's purpose justified the intrusion; and (4) whether the means adopted were proper and
reasonable).
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Some courts have ordered testing of collateral parties based on the court's inherent
powers or upon statutory interpretation.38 For example, a New Jersey court held:
If a court has the inherent power to require a nonparty to give evidence in the form
of testimony in the quest for the truth, it also has the inherent power to require a
nonparty to give evidence in the form of a blood sample in the quest for the truth.39

In contrast, the Supreme Court of Louisiana employed civil discovery rules to order
the legitimate daughter of a decedent, who was not a party to the case, to submit to a
blood test for DNA testing.40
In Maine, courts may issue subpoenas to compel a nonparty adult to provide
“testimony or to produce and permit inspection and copying of designated books,
documents or tangible things, or permit inspection of premises, in the possession,
custody or control of that person.”41 While the plain language of this rule does not
suggest that subpoenas may be used to obtain DNA samples from collateral parties, it
seems plausible that a court could broadly interpret the rule or extrapolate from it to
allow for such subpoenas.
Some courts have raised the question of whether ordering the submission to DNA
testing is a violation of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The United States Supreme Court recognized that because
blood testing requires an intrusion into the body of a defendant, the Fourth Amendment
requires that it be supported by probable cause.42 Although Schmerber was a criminal
case, the Court has since held that the constraints of the Fourth Amendment also apply
in the civil context.43 In the context of a paternity action, a New Jersey appellate court
required the plaintiff to show, as a prerequisite to court-ordered blood testing of
collateral parties, that there was “an articulable reason” for suspecting that the decedent
was the plaintiff’s father.44

38. See, e.g., In re Estate of Rogers, 583 A.2d 782, 783-84 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (ex-wife
ordered to submit to tests); Sudwischer, 589 So.2d at 476 (legitimate daughter ordered to submit to tests).
39. Rogers, 583 A.2d at 784. Specifically, the court held that the trial court had the inherent power to
order a collateral party to submit to blood tests and to use contempt or other sanctions to coerce that party’s
compliance if it found the plaintiffs needed the blood test results to meet their burden of proof in the
underlying paternity action. Id. See also Tipps v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 768 F. Supp. 577, 580 (S.D. Tex.
1991) (finding that DNA testing of living relatives provided the clear and convincing evidence required to
rebut the presumption that the decedent was the plaintiff's biological father).
40. Sudwischer, 589 So.2d at 475 (relying on the fact that the state’s discovery rules provide for
discovery of any non-privileged matter that is relevant to the subject matter of the case).
41. ME. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(C). See also ME. R. CIV. P. 34(c) (“A person not a party to the action may
be compelled to produce documents and things or to submit to an inspection as provided in Rule 45.”).
42. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966). See State v. Chase, 2001 ME 68, 785 A.2d
702 (Me. 2001), for an application of this holding in Maine criminal law. In deciding Chase, the Law
Court held: “Although a blood test does constitute a search that normally requires a warrant based on
probable cause, . . . no Fourth Amendment violation occurred . . . because the police had probable cause
to believe that [the defendant] was operating under the influence . . . .” Id. ¶ 14, 785 A.2d at 706 (citation
omitted).
43. See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
44. Rogers, 583 A.2d at 785.
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C. Testing the Body of the Decedent
In intestate succession cases involving petitions to exhume and test the body of a
deceased putative father, courts have generally granted such requests unless barred
from doing so by a specific statute.45 For example, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
held that as long as the plaintiff presented a “reasonable cause” to believe that the
exhumation of the decedent would conclusively prove paternity, the court should grant
the exhumation request.46 Some states have enacted posthumous paternity laws that
allow courts to order the testing of the deceased putative father’s remains.47
Prior to Kingsbury, Maine law contained no guidance, statutory or otherwise,
regarding whether an intestate decedent’s body could be exhumed for DNA paternity
testing. Ultimately, the Law Court concluded that the inherent power of the Probate
Court includes the authority to order exhumation for genetic testing.48
IV. THE KINGSBURY DECISION
Bruce Kingsbury (Kingsbury) died on March 18, 2006.49 At the time of the
execution of his will he was married to Gloria Kingsbury, to whom he left his entire
estate.50 However, he and Gloria subsequently divorced, and he failed to revoke or
change the provisions of his will.51 Accordingly, Gloria’s rights under the will were
nullified because “the Probate Code provides that the effect of the divorce was a
revocation of the disposition to Gloria . . . .”52 The will failed to provide an alternate
disposition; therefore, the estate passed to Kingsbury’s heirs in accordance with the
MPC’s intestacy provisions.53 Because Kingsbury was not survived by a spouse or
registered domestic partner, the MPC dictated that his estate was to be distributed to
his children.54

45. Le Ray, supra note 4, at 766-67.
46. Wawrykow v. Simonich, 652 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
47. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-286 (1999). Virginia’s statute, in relevant part, provides:
In any case of death in which a private person has an interest, such person may petition the
judge of the circuit court exercising jurisdiction over the place of interment and, upon proper
showing of sufficient cause, such judge may order the body exhumed. . . .
....
Upon the petition of a party attempting to prove . . . that he is the issue of a person dead and
buried, a court may order the exhumation of the body of a dead person for the conduct of
scientifically reliable genetic tests, including DNA tests, to prove a biological relationship.
. . . This provision is intended to provide a procedural mechanism for obtaining posthumous
samples for reliable genetic testing and shall not require substantive proof of parentage to
obtain the exhumation order.
See id. § 32.1-286(B)-(C).
48. Kingsbury, 2008 ME 79, ¶ 9, 946 A.2d at 394.
49. Brief for the Appellant at 1, In re Kingsbury, 2008 ME 79, 946 A.2d 389 (2008) (No. SAG-07520).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-508 (1998)).
53. Id. (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-101 (1998)).
54. Brief for the Appellee at 1, In re Kingsbury, 2008 ME 79, 946 A.2d 389 (2008) (No. SAG-07-520).
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Gloria is the mother of Terri MacMahan, who was conceived while Gloria was
married to Larry Burnham.55 However, during that marriage, Gloria was involved in
an intimate relationship with Kingsbury.56 During Kingsbury’s lifetime, neither he nor
anyone else told MacMahan that he could be her biological father.57 She was informed
of this possibility following Kingsbury’s death.58
On April 3, 2006, Kingsbury’s daughter Robin Whorff filed an Application for
Informal Probate of Will and Appointment of Personal Representative with the
Sagadahoc County Probate Court, wherein she claimed to be Kingsbury’s sole heir and
requested her appointment as personal representative.59 On May 4, 2006, MacMahan
filed a petition requesting, as a biological daughter of Kingsbury, that she and Whorff
share in the distribution of the estate60 pursuant to title 18-A, section 3-1001 of the
Maine Revised Statutes. Initially, Kingsbury’s siblings agreed to provide DNA
samples to MacMahan for the purpose of proving her biological relationship to
Kingsbury; however, they later reneged.61
On November 30, 2006, MacMahan filed an Emergency Motion for Continuance
asking the court to compel Whorff to submit to DNA testing, or alternatively, to order
the exhumation of Kingsbury’s body for such testing.62 The Probate Court granted
MacMahan’s motion, ordering that Whorff submit to the test within forty-five days of
the order, otherwise the body would be exhumed for testing.63 The Probate Court
based its authority to order the exhumation on its equitable jurisdiction.64
On appeal to the Law Court, Whorff argued that her interlocutory appeal was
appropriate under the “death knell exception”65 to the final judgment rule.66

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2-3.
64. See Kingsbury, 2008 ME 79, ¶¶ 8-9, 946 A.2d at 393-94 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 252
(2007)).
65. There are three “narrow and well-defined exceptions” to the final judgment rule: the collateral order
exception, the death knell exception, and the judicial economy exception. Bruesewitz v. Grant, 2007 ME
13, ¶¶ 5-8, 912 A.2d 1255, 1257-58 (quoting State v. Me. State Employees, 482 A.2d 461, 464 (Me.
1984)). “The death knell exception allows for an appeal of an interlocutory order ‘where substantial rights
of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment.’” Bruesewitz, 2007 ME 13, ¶
8, 912 A.2d at 1258 (quoting Webb v. Haas, 1999 ME 74, ¶ 5, 728 A.2d 1261, 1264) (citation omitted).
“The death knell exception applies only to orders that, without an interlocutory appeal, result in a
substantial loss or sacrifice of the rights, property, or claim at issue.” Id. (citing ALEXANDER, MAINE
APPELLATE PRACTICE § 304(a), at 166 (2005)). Only when “the injury to the plaintiff’s claimed right would
otherwise be imminent, concrete, and irreparable,” will the Law Court review an interlocutory appeal
pursuant to the death knell exception. In re Bailey M., 2002 ME 12, ¶ 7, 788 A.2d 590, 594 (quoting
Morse Bros., Inc. v. Webster, 2001 ME 70, ¶ 14, 772 A.2d 842, 847). “A right will be ‘irreparably lost’
if [the appellate court] . . . could not effectively provide a remedy to the appellant if [it] . . . ultimately
decided to vacate the interlocutory determination after a final judgment.” Id. ¶ 8, 788 A.2d at 594 (quoting
Andrews v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 1998 ME 198, ¶ 4, 716 A.2d 212, 215).
66. “[A]ppeals, in order to be cognizable, must be from a final judgment.” Bruesewitz, 2007 ME 13,
¶ 5, 912 A.2d at 1257 (quoting State v. Lemay, 611 A.2d 67, 68 (Me. 1992) (citation omitted)). A final
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Specifically, Whorff argued that if she were “not allowed to appeal [before the
exhumation], substantial rights w[ould] be irreparably lost, viz., the prevention of
exhumation of the remains.”67 Moreover, Whorff argued that the exhumation would
be at the estate’s expense.68
On the merits, Whorff argued that title 4, section 252 of the Maine Revised
Statutes, which grants the court equitable jurisdiction and upon which the court relied
for its order, did not provide authority to order exhumation.69 Whorff conceded that
section 252 provides that the Probate Court may exercise equity jurisdiction in
connection with probate administration “in civil actions in which equitable relief is
sought,” but she argued that because MacMahan did not commence a civil proceeding,
“much less one requesting equitable relief,” MacMahan was not entitled to equitable
relief under section 252.70
Additionally, Whorff contended that there was no authority under Maine law for
the court to order the exhumation.71 Lastly, Whorff contended that MacMahan’s
petition represented the functional equivalent of a time-barred paternity action under
the MAP.72
In her opposing brief, MacMahan argued that the appeal from the interlocutory
order was inappropriate.73 She argued that the death knell exception did not apply
because the substantial right that Whorff argued would be irreparably lost (i.e., the
prevention of the exhumation) would only be sacrificed if Whorff refused to submit to
DNA testing.74 Additionally, MacMahan refuted (1) Whorff’s contentions regarding
the Probate Court’s authority to grant the equitable relief of exhuming the body, and
(2) that the petition constituted a time-barred paternity action.75
In a four-to-three decision, the Law Court held that Whorff’s appeal qualified for
interlocutory appeal under the death knell exception and found that the Probate Court
was authorized to order the exhumation of Kingsbury’s body.76 On the procedural
issue, the Law Court reasoned that if the estate were “not permitted to seek redress
now, its right to prevent the exhumation of Kingsbury’s remains w[ould] be irreparably

judgment is one that “fully decides and disposes of the entire matter pending before the court or
administrative agency, leaving no questions for the future consideration and judgment of the court or
administrative agency.” MacPherson v. Estate of MacPherson, 2007 ME 52, ¶ 5, 919 A.2d 1174, 1175
(quoting Carroll v. Town of Rockport, 2003 ME 135, ¶ 16, 837 A.2d 148, 154 (Me. 2003)). “Any other
interim order is deemed interlocutory and is not subject to appellate review until such a final judgment
issues.” Kingsbury, 2008 ME 79, ¶ 4, 946 A.2d at 392.
67. Brief for the Appellant, supra note 49, at 2.
68. Id. at 2-3.
69. Id. at 3.
70. Id. at 4.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 6. Whorff noted that title 19-A, section 1554 of the Maine Revised Statutes provided that
a paternity action must be commenced by the putative child’s eighteenth birthday. Id. Whorff contended
that the MAP provided the exclusive means by which MacMahan could establish paternity and, because
the statute of limitations for such an action had expired, the petition was time-barred. Id. at 6-7.
73. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 54, at 4.
74. Id. at 5.
75. Id. at 6-20.
76. Kingsbury, 2008 ME 79, ¶ 1, 946 A.2d at 391.
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lost.”77 The court noted that if the estate were barred from exercising its right to
prevent the exhumation, “that right will be lost forever, and we could afford no
adequate remedy for the violation of that right if the Probate Court’s final judgment on
MacMahan’s petition was later vacated.”78
The court declined to determine whether the first alternative (i.e., ordering Whorff
to submit to DNA testing) was sufficient to satisfy the death knell exception to the final
judgment rule. Instead, the court held that Whorff, as personal representative of the
estate, could “challenge the exhumation portion of the court’s order without regard to
the other alternative in the order regarding her personally.”79
The Law Court determined that the Probate Court possessed personal jurisdiction
over Kingsbury’s estate, subject matter jurisdiction over MacMahan’s petition, and
equitable jurisdiction in this case.80 Next, the court held that “[b]y the plain language
of sections 1-302(b) and -252, the Probate Court has equitable authority to decide all
matters relating to the determination of Kingsbury's heirs and administration of his
estate, and may take any action necessary to resolve such disputes properly before it.”81
However, the court noted that “the authority of the Probate Court is not without limit,
and that there must be good cause or sufficient reason advanced to justify exercise of
such broad power.”82 By this standard, the court determined that MacMahan had
presented sufficient evidence that she was Kingsbury’s biological daughter and that
such evidence created “at the very least a reasonable probability that genetic testing of
Kingsbury's exhumed body, as ordered by the Probate Court, w[ould] reveal that
MacMahan is the daughter of Kingsbury.”83 Accordingly, the court held that “the
Probate Court was indeed authorized to order the exhumation of Kingsbury's remains
for the purpose of DNA paternity testing in connection with MacMahan's petition.”84
The dissent argued that because Whorff was “both the personal representative and
a party-in-interest in this action,” she was “properly subject to a discovery request and
order in either capacity.”85 Thus, the dissent argued, the Law Court should not have
been involved in this “interlocutory discovery dispute.”86 Rather, the Probate Court
should have “directed Whorff to provide a sample for DNA testing or, alternatively,
face a default on the issue that would be subject to the genetic test.”87 The dissent
reasoned that “[s]uch an order, part of ongoing discovery that occurs in civil and
criminal cases, should not justify an interlocutory appeal.”88 Moreover, “[h]aving to
give a small sample of one's hair or other similar, noninvasive sample does not cause

77. Id. ¶ 6, 946 A.2d at 392.
78. Id. ¶ 6, 946 A.2d at 393.
79. Id. ¶ 6, 946 A.2d at 392 n.2.
80. Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 946 A.2d at 393-94.
81. Id. ¶ 9, 946 A.2d at 393-94.
82. Id. ¶ 9, 946 A.2d at 394 (emphasis added). The italicized language appears to be the standard
announced by the Law Court for determining future analogous cases.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. ¶ 11, 946 A.2d at 394.
86. Id. ¶ 10, 946 A.2d at 394.
87. Id. ¶ 11, 946 A.2d at 394.
88. Id.
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a substantial or irreparable loss of a right, property, or claim” as would justify an
interlocutory appeal under the death knell exception to the final judgment rule.89
V. ANALYSIS
Kingsbury presented the question of how the law should deal with requests for
posthumous paternity testing in the context of intestate succession proceedings. In
effect, the Kingsbury decision establishes that in such cases, the Probate Court—upon
a showing that paternity will likely be established—may order that a party-in-action,
who is a blood relative of the decedent, submit to DNA testing pursuant to rule 35 of
the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure. Alternatively, if the party refuses to so submit,
the court is authorized to order the disinterment of the decedent’s body for DNA
testing. Although Kingsbury was a step in the right direction, the law should be further
refined to better serve the interests of illegitimate children.
A. Conflicting Interests in Posthumous Paternity Testing
Obviously, a putative illegitimate child has a substantial financial interest in posthumous paternity testing—the possibility of obtaining inheritance rights to the decedent’s estate under state intestacy laws. However, apart from this financial interest, the
illegitimate child has other substantial interests in determining paternity posthumously.
Perhaps most compelling among these is the child’s interest in learning the
medical histories of her biological parents. Commentators have noted that knowledge
of both parents’ medical histories enables a child to be aware of genetic predispositions
to certain illnesses thereby allowing the child to take preventive medical measures and
make lifestyle adaptations.90 Conversely, if a child is ignorant of a parent’s medical
history, there is a substantial risk that the child’s health will eventually suffer; the
availability of family medical information could result in faster and more accurate
diagnoses and, in turn, better treatment and preventive care. In addition, beyond risks
to her own health, the illegitimate child who does not know both parents’ medical
histories has a justifiable concern about potentially dangerous genetic predispositions
facing their own children.
Another considerable interest of the illegitimate child in this context is the
relationship between the illegitimate child’s sense of personal and cultural identity and
the knowledge of her biological origins.91 For example, studies of adopted children

89. Id. ¶ 13, 946 A.2d at 394.
90. See Donald C. Hubin, Daddy Dilemmas: Untangling the Puzzles of Paternity, 13 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 29, 32-35 (2003) (“Individuals who lack the medical history of both parents are at a
disadvantage in the diagnosis and treatment of a variety of diseases compared to those who possess such
information.”); see also Lauren Taub, Major Privacy Concerns When Minor Sues for Paternity, 26 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 459, 465 (2008). Taub asserts:
[A] child may have a medical interest in finding his or her parents’ identity because many
medical disorders are genetic and can be inherited from maternal or paternal lines. If
potential defects are determined early in the child’s life, there is a possibility that the defects
can be prevented or treated to minimize the effects of an inherited disease.
Id.
91. Ilene Sherwyn Cooper, Posthumous Paternity Testing: A Proposal to Amend EPTL 4-1.2(A)(2)(D),
69 ALB. L. REV. 947, 965 (2006) (“Apart from financial benefits, a determination of paternity will also
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have found that a child’s knowledge of her background is crucial to the formation of
positive self-identity.92
Lastly, it is important to consider the illegitimate child’s interest in simply knowing the identity of her father. Who was he? What were the circumstances of the
parental relationship? What is the story of his life? These are reasonable and unavoidable questions, and the illegitimate child has an interest in finding their answers.
In the context of posthumous paternity testing, the opposing interests belong to the
people from whom DNA samples are obtained as well as those who have an interest
in keeping the decedent’s body undisturbed. For example, blood relatives of the
decedent have a privacy interest in preventing the invasion of their person for the
purpose of obtaining a DNA sample for testing. With regard to testing the decedent’s
body, the family may have an emotional and religious interest in keeping the
decedent’s body undisturbed. Lastly, recognized heirs of an intestate decedent have
a financial interest in denying a putative illegitimate child access to proof of paternity
(i.e., a sample of their DNA), on the basis of which he or she could gain a substantial
share in the estate.
B. Balancing the Interests
Upon balancing the aforementioned competing interests, the interests of the
illegitimate child outweigh the opposing interests. First, compare the illegitimate
child’s interests to those of a blood relative from whom a DNA sample is sought. The
illegitimate child’s interests—gaining inheritance rights, learning of a biological
parent’s medical history, and developing a more complete sense of identity—are far
more compelling than the privacy and financial interests of blood relatives from whom
DNA samples are sought. The argument in support of the privacy interest of blood
relatives of the decedent is attenuated by the fact that the bodily invasion in obtaining
a DNA sample is minimal. DNA samples can be obtained from blood, tissue, pulled
head hair samples with intact roots, fingernail clippings, bone marrow, tooth pulp,
dried blood stains, and biopsy samples.93
In contrast to this Note’s contention that the financial interests of the recognized
heirs of an intestate decedent—in preventing the illegitimate child’s access to proof of
paternity—are outweighed by the aforementioned interests of the illegitimate child, one
Commentator has suggested that in the context of posthumous paternity testing, the
illegitimate child should not share in the distribution of the estate because she did not
share in the parent-child relationship.94 Under this theory, one could argue that the

provide a child with the intangible psychological and emotional benefits inherent in both establishing a
familial bond and learning cultural heritage. Indeed, an individual’s sense of identity is often linked to an
awareness of parentage and family history.”).
92. See generally Ilke Turkmendag, Robert Dingwall & Thérèse Murphy, The Removal of Donor
Anonymity in the UK: The Silencing of Claims by Would-Be Parents, 22 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 283
(2008); Alexina McWhinnie, Gamete donation and anonymity: Should offspring from donated gametes
continue to be denied knowledge of their origins and antecedents?, 16 HUM. REPROD. 807 (2001); JOHN
TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS: THE EXPERIENCES OF ADOPTED PEOPLE (1973).
93. Le Ray, supra note 4, at 764-65.
94. Megan Pendleton, supra note 11, at 2827. Pendleton argues that in heirship determinations “the
threshold inquiry should be the nature of the parent-child relationship,” and “legislatures should assign
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balance tips in favor of legitimate children; that is, the illegitimate child should not be
allowed to assert inheritance rights by determining paternity after the putative father’s
death. However, upon reflection, this argument is unconvincing. Intestate inheritance
rights are determined by reference to state laws, which must allow for inheritance by
illegitimate children. Thus, the illegitimate child has an equal financial interest in the
decedent’s estate. In addition, the child’s other interests—such as learning family
medical history and developing a better sense of identity—tip the scales in favor of
allowing posthumous paternity testing using the DNA samples of blood relatives (i.e.,
legitimate children).
Now, compare the interests of those who have an emotional and religious interest
in keeping the decedent’s body undisturbed with those of the illegitimate child. In the
event that the decedent’s body is exhumed for DNA testing, the decedent’s family and
friends would likely be subjected to emotional distress. However, the aforementioned
compelling interests of the illegitimate child outweigh the temporary emotional distress
resulting from the exhumation of the decedent’s body. Moreover, in light of the
intestacy law policy goal of determining the rightful heirs of the decedent, the law
should favor posthumous paternity determinations over temporary emotional distress.
Lastly, an instructive comparison can be drawn between posthumous paternity
testing and adoption and sperm donor cases. In most cases in which there is an
adopted or artificially conceived child, there is a living biological father. As such, the
living father has competing interests that may include a desire to remain anonymous
to the child and a desire to remain free from obligation to the child. In the context of
adoption and sperm donor cases, the father’s interest in anonymity is considerable and
weighs heavily against an adopted or artificially conceived child’s right to know.95 In
contrast, the issue of anonymity is not a consideration in the case of posthumous
paternity testing because the putative father is dead. This raises the argument that if
the adopted child has the right to certain information regarding his biological parents,96
so too should the illegitimate child in a posthumous paternity determination case.

courts the discretion to evaluate the existence of a familial parent-child relationship when paternity is at
stake in intestate inheritance claims.” Id. Pendleton’s argument is based on the intestacy law policy goal
of effectuating the probable intent of the decedent, which, according to Pendleton, would be to distribute
the estate only to those children with whom the decedent had a relationship. Id.; see also Susan N. Gary,
Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 26-27 (2000) (“The data provides
overwhelming support for the proposition that the public believes that disposition through intestacy should
reflect families as functional units and not be based merely on legal ties of marriage, blood and adoption.”).
95. See, e.g., Taub, supra note 90, at 483. Taub notes:
If a court determined that a child’s best interests were served by acquiring information about
his or her absent biological parent, the court could award the child non-identifying
information about the parent. An award of non-identifying information would protect the
privacy of both biological parents, yet provide the child with necessary medical or
psychological information about the absent biological parent.
Id.
96. The Maine Legislature recently passed a law authorizing adult adoptees to obtain a copy of their
original certificate of birth from the State Registrar of Vital Statistics. ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2768
(2008). Additionally, the law provides that birth parents of adoptees shall have the option of providing a
medical history form and a contact preference form, which are kept with the certificate of birth. See id. §
2769.
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C. Beyond Balancing Interests: Other Reasons for a Change in the Law
One Commentator, Kate Schuler, suggested that posthumous paternity cases
should be resolved by giving the courts discretion and by providing statutory standards
of proof (i.e., “clear and convincing proof”).97 However, she noted that it is unfair to
impose the “clear and convincing proof” standard while denying illegitimate children
access to DNA evidence by which to meet the standard. This is the current state of the
law in Maine.98 Schuler reasoned that with the advent of accurate DNA paternity
testing “deceased putative fathers are protected against false paternity claims, [and]
illegitimate children must be protected against impossible hurdles in proving
paternity.”99 Schuler concluded:
[U]nless an illegitimate child has a fair opportunity to obtain posthumous DNA
evidence, the “clear and convincing” standard is inequitable . . . . Lowering standards
for a court order of exhumation or the blood testing of relatives seems to be a
necessary outcome if a state’s goal is to grant illegitimate children equality with those
children born in wedlock.100

Schuler’s observations illuminate the current inadequacy of Maine’s probate code.
In the event that a child learns of her biological father for the first time only after his
death, such as the petitioner in Kingsbury, that child faces significant hurdles in
determining her true paternity. Although the Kingsbury decision made positive strides
by affirming the Probate Court’s authority to order a party-in-action to submit to DNA
testing and to exhume the decedent’s body for such testing, the law should be further
refined to facilitate the availability of DNA samples for posthumous paternity testing.
Specifically, the Maine Legislature should codify Kingsbury as well as expand
upon its holding by authorizing the genetic testing of collateral parties, which is less
controversial and less burdensome than testing the body of the decedent. Moreover,
if collateral parties are unavailable or refuse to submit to testing, then the law should
favor exhuming the body for dispositive DNA testing—rather than forcing the
opposing party to face a conditional default judgment.
Those who would object to such a statutory scheme should consider that any
perceived injustice is easily avoided by the creation of an effective will, which would
avoid any involvement of intestacy statutes.101

97. Kate Schuler, The Liberalization of Posthumous Paternity Testing—Expanding the Rights of
Illegitimate Children, 17 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 150, 172 (2003).
98. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109 (1998).
99. Schuler, supra note 97, at 174 (“An illegitimate child must still be required to prove paternity of
a decedent by clear and convincing evidence. However, illegitimate children must also be allowed to enter
into evidence posthumous scientific paternity tests in order to meet that standard.”).
100. Id. at 152.
101. This Note is limited in scope to posthumous paternity testing in the context of intestate decedents.
However, the questions posed here should be considered in other contexts as well. For example, what rights
do illegitimate children have to posthumous paternity determinations when the decedent did not die
intestate? Should these people be allowed to subpoena DNA samples from relatives or exhume the body
for testing?
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D. Proposed Changes to Maine Law
The statutory revisions proposed below essentially codify Kingsbury and expand
upon it by providing for the testing of collateral parties and implementing a hierarchy
of sources for paternity testing. Although the Kingsbury precedent is, in large part, the
functional equivalent of the ideal law in this area, it falls short in one respect.
Specifically, the Probate Court’s order did not order testing of Kingsbury’s siblings
(i.e., collateral parties) in addition to its order that Kingsbury’s legitimate daughter
(i.e., representative of the estate and party-in-interest) submit to testing. Accordingly,
the issue of testing collateral parties did not come before the Law Court, thus limiting
its holding in that respect. The Maine Legislature should revise its statutory scheme
in accordance with the revisions set forth below.
Maine should adopt the updated 1990 version of the UPC,102 which incorporates
the paternity-determination provisions of the state’s applicable paternity statute; thus,
in Maine, the UPC would incorporate the MAP. In addition, the MAP paternitydetermination provision103 should be amended to include the additional underlined
language:
The court, upon its own initiative or upon suggestion made by or on behalf of a
person whose blood or tissue is involved or the mother, may order or, upon motion
of a party to the action made at a time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly, shall
order the mother, child and alleged father to submit to blood or tissue typing tests,
which may include, but are not limited to, tests of red cell antigens, red cell
isoenzymes, human leukocyte antigens and serum proteins. If the alleged father is
deceased, the court shall order DNA testing of blood relatives of the decedent, upon
a showing that paternity may be established by the testing of such relatives. If a blood
relative of the decedent is a party to the action, that relative should be tested first
pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 35. In the event that a blood relative is not a party to the
action or refuses to submit to testing,104 the court shall order DNA testing of blood
relatives of the decedent who are not parties to the action. If blood relatives are
unavailable or refuse105 to submit to DNA testing, the court shall order DNA testing

102. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114, 8 U.L.A. 91 (1997).
103. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1558 (1998).
104. Rule 37 of the Maine Rules of Probate Procedure (incorporating by reference Rule 37 of the Maine
Rules of Civil Procedure) provides the court means by which to sanction parties who fail to comply with
orders. In the case of a failure to comply with an order to submit to a physical examination (i.e., provide
a DNA sample), the rule provides that a court may issue an order:
(A) . . . that “matters regarding which the order was made . . . shall be taken to be
established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining
the order; . . .
(C) . . . staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient
party[.]
ME. R. PROB. P. 37(b)(2)(A), (C). Notably, however, the court may not treat such a failure to comply as
contempt of court. See id. at 37(b)(2)(D).
105. Although DNA samples are not mentioned in Rule 45 of the Maine Rules of Probate Procedure
(incorporating by reference Rule 45 of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure), this Note contends that
ordering DNA testing of collateral parties in posthumous paternity cases should be viewed as a type of
subpoena. Accordingly, collateral parties refusing to submit to such testing could be held in contempt. Id.
at 45(f).
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of the decedent’s body or other samples. If genetic samples from the decedent or his
blood relatives are stored in a DNA database, the court shall order their release for
testing, and shall do so before ordering the testing of the decedent's relatives or testing
of the decedent’s body. If a party refuses to submit to those tests, the court may
resolve the question of paternity against that party or may enforce the order, if the
rights of others and the interests of justice so require.106

In sum, questions regarding paternity in probate proceedings would be resolved
by reference to the UPC’s incorporation of a revised MAP. The effect of this statutory
change would be the creation of a hierarchy of sources of DNA for the purpose of
posthumous paternity testing.
Under this hierarchy, a blood relative who is a party to the action would be
ordered to submit to DNA testing by the non-invasive means of providing a bodily
sample. If a blood relative party-in-interest does not exist or refuses to submit to
testing, the hierarchy shifts to blood relatives who are collateral parties, requiring the
same testing as previously mentioned. If such parties do not exist or refuse to submit
to testing, then the hierarchy shifts to testing of the decedent’s body.107 If this is the
case, the court is authorized to exhume the body to obtain samples for testing.
There is, however, an important exception to all of the aforementioned means of
posthumous paternity testing. If genetic samples from the decedent or his blood
relatives are stored in a DNA database, the court will order their release for testing and
will do so before ordering the testing of the decedent's relatives—whether they are
parties to the action or not—or testing of the decedent’s body.
There remains only one possible situation for resolution. What if the intestate
decedent’s relatives refuse to submit to DNA testing, and the decedent’s body is
cremated or otherwise unavailable for testing? In that case, the Probate Court should

106. I base my suggested revision of the MAP on Charles Nelson Le Ray’s suggested revision of section
7 of the UAP, which provides:
The court, upon its own initiative or upon suggestion made by or on behalf of any person
whose blood is involved may, or upon motion of any party to the [action] [proceeding] made
at a time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly, shall order the mother, child and alleged
father to submit to blood or other genetic tests. If the alleged father is deceased, the court
may order DNA testing of his body or other samples, or of blood relatives of the deceased,
upon a showing that paternity may be established by the testing of such relatives. If genetic
samples from the deceased or his blood relatives are stored in a DNA database, the court
may order their release for testing, and shall do so before ordering the testing of the
deceased’s relatives. The results of these DNA tests shall be limited to the question of
paternity and shall not reveal information about any party’s physical characteristics,
predisposition to certain medical conditions or other matters. If any party refuses to submit
to such tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity against such party or enforce
its order if the rights of others and the interests of justice so require.
Le Ray, supra note 4, at 796 (revisions underlined). Notably, Le Ray’s suggested revision provides courts
with the authority to order testing of the decedent’s body or his blood relatives without offering guidance
on which is preferable; apparently, the decision is left to the discretion of the courts. In contrast, my
suggested revision provides that the possibility of testing blood relatives should be exhausted before the
court orders exhumation and testing of the decedent’s body.
107. “DNA fingerprinting can establish paternity even when the putative father is deceased because
DNA testing uses molecules that remain stable and testable long after death.” Le Ray, supra note 4, at 764.
These molecular samples can be obtained from preserved blood or tissue, pulled head hair samples with
intact roots, fingernail clippings, bone marrow, tooth pulp, dried blood stains, and biopsy samples. Id.
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refer to the last sentence of section 1558 and resolve the question of paternity against
the party refusing to submit to testing.
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposed changes reflect the utility of using non-invasive, accurate DNA
samples from living blood relatives of the decedent for posthumous paternity testing
in intestate succession proceedings. Such testing is justified by balancing the interests
of the relatives of the decedent against those of the putative illegitimate child. In the
exceedingly rare event that blood relatives do not exist or refuse to submit to testing,
exhumation of the decedent’s body is justified. Although the prospect of raising the
dead is disturbing, it is a justifiable last resort upon consideration of the following: in
most cases decedents have wills that render the proposed intestacy laws inapplicable
to them. Moreover, even where the decedent dies intestate, it seems plausible that in
most cases he or she will have left behind at least one blood relative who will be
available and willing to supply a DNA sample for testing. In the rarest of cases where
an intestate decedent leaves no relatives behind from whom DNA samples can be
obtained, the exhumation of his body is justified by the weightier interests of the
putative illegitimate child in obtaining inheritance rights and finding answers to
questions of medical history and personal identity.

